Indiana prisons violate an orthodox Jew's rights

The removal of kosher meals from prison cafeterias because of rising costs constituted a violation of the prisoners’ rights to observe their religious beliefs, according to a federal judge’s recent ruling in the case of the Orthodox Jew inmate Matson Willis v. the Indiana Department of Corrections.

This ruling comes at the end of a long line of decisions in favor of the right to religious customs because of the cost and efficiency concerns of institutions such as public schools and prisons.

Though it may seem obvious to state that America is a country where freedom of religion is protected, there can be an inherent trouble with protecting that freedom when it comes to understanding where and how to draw the line between legitimate religious belief and pure, underhanded use of the system.

Perhaps it is fair and common courtesy to provide Orthodox Jews with kosher meals when incarcerated, but there are implications to extending that analysis to less formally recognized religions or religions whose very tenets oppose the concept of incarceration.

Take, for example, the hypothetical instance of a religion that only possesses half a dozen or so followers, but which nevertheless includes in its major book of faith extremely strict dietary requirements and restrictions on the fibers used in clothing.  

Would the prison itself be given the authority to determine whether or not the religious belief was legitimate enough to warrant accommodation? The judicial system? Some elected committee of religion?

One solution would be to accommodate major world religions with services on prison grounds only (i.e. services that can be monitored for participation), but such a solution is intuitively prejudiced, unfair and against the whole nature of most spirituality. If any religion is considered legitimate by the law, all must be at least genuinely considered for the same status.

And yet, this brings us to a different problem. What happens in the case of a religion such that the basic tenets of the faith entail that — for example — no clothing can be worn at any time?  Will we have nudist prisons?  

Or better, what if a religion entails specifically that one can never live inside or be confined to a man-made enclosure?

It is possible to conceive of such a religion, and certainly no one in their right mind would assert that it is the right of such believers not to be incarcerated at all.

Thus, it is important to consider the judicial and logical consequences of accommodating religious belief in prisons before making blanket assertions about rights and responsibilities. The trouble with such assertions is in drawing the line between what does and does not qualify for accommodation.