A means to an end in Afghanistan

When the Bush Administration went to war against al-Qaida and the Taliban, it squandered the opportunity to show the Afghan people that the U.S. is on their side and that we are only after those responsible for the attacks.

The former administration sought to fight the war on the cheap, utlizing a “small footprint” strategy to overthrow the Taliban.

This strategy was ultimately an “enemy-centric” form of warfighting that neglected the strategic focus where it was needed – on the Afghan population. The result is the current situation we see today.

The insurgency has grown as a result of several factors. In Helmand Province, farmers have turned to the insurgency to protect their opium crops. Also, military strikes using Predator drones have killed many innocent civilians.

And a lack of law enforcement, economic opportunity and governance created a power vacuum in which the Taliban has filled in critical areas.

In those areas where the insurgency has flourished, the insurgency has recruited into its ranks those who have been disenfranchised or alienated from the Afghan government and ISAF forces.

This is the result of policy that does not fit the type of war the U.S. military is fighting.
Rather than attempting to isolate the population from the insurgents, military forces have sought to fight the insurgents head-on, resulting in incidents that create resentment of its presence there.

In counterinsurgency warfare, the objective is the support of the population, not the destruction of the enemy. Past policies have allowed the insurgency to flourish, particularly in the rural areas.

ISAF forces would clear an area of insurgent activity; however, once they left the insurgents would return. This back and forth exchange put the population in the middle of the violence. While many Afghans are on our side, some have a deep hatred of U.S. military presence there that was brought not through ideology, but through poor policy and focus.

Objectives cannot be achieved through military force alone. While security is important, it cannot be seen as the end.

Instead, building popular support for the Afghan government is the primary goal.
However, the government lacks the resources to effectively govern at the local level. The U.S. must devote substantial civilian resources as well as sending more troops to “take and hold” areas in which the insurgency operates. Previous strategy was focused on defeating the insurgents, neglecting the necessary steps for nation-building to ensure post-conflict stability once U.S. forces leave.

Neglecting to allocate sufficient civilian resources ultimately squanders military successes. The U.S. military cannot “hold” an area indefinitely. Rather, providing security should allow for civilian elements to operate in order to provide services and develop the infrastructure necessary to gain the support of some of the most impoverished people in the world.

The road will be tough, but the American people must be willing to stomach the difficulties that lie ahead.

Past policies are changing under new leadership. We cannot abandon hope when policies are finally turning for the better, despite the recent rise in violence.

Jared Stancombe is a 2009 IU graduate.