Democracy for allies too

Two years ago, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf promised to step down as head of Pakistan's army before the end of 2004. Just before the New Year, in typical dictatorial fashion, he broke his own word and decided to keep the most powerful job in the country. \nGiven that the White House has put forth so much rhetoric to encourage democracy in the Muslim world, you would think the administration would be quick to criticize this clearly autocratic move. However, rather than criticizing Musharraf, Washington actually praised Pakistan's democratic rights record.\nSecretary of State Colin Powell, while commenting on Musharraf's decision, said Pakistan has "moved toward democracy" since 2001. In reality, quite the opposite is true. Musharraf has moved away from democracy by increasing his own power and not that of his people.\nMusharraf forced a series of measures known as the Legal Framework Order down Pakistan's throat in 2002. The LFO gave him "democratic" rights, such as the ability to dismiss provincial governments at whim. It fostered the creation of a National Security Council that keeps the presidential cabinet and other institutions in line. According to the political liberties watchdog group Freedom House, the military staffs this council, and through the use of "army monitoring teams," it has put a leash on any potential dissent within civilian governmental institutions.\nThe United States avoids confronting Pakistan on its atrocious record because it fears Musharraf will drop out of the war on terror if he is criticized too harshly. But by keeping quiet, we're causing much more long-term damage than whatever short-term small gains remain for a U.S.-Pakistani relationship.\nThe recent chumminess between Islamabad and Washington originated from the need to remove the Taliban regime and capture Osama bin Laden; Pakistan offers a strategic location for both operations. Now the war in Afghanistan is abating with a successful election and possible surrender of former Taliban fighters. Only the possibility of capturing bin Laden appears to be holding the relationship together. But even he appears to be little more than a figurehead these days, meaning his capture likely would have little effect on the execution of the vast majority of terrorist attacks.\nRecent appeasement of Pakistani autocracy has achieved all we needed it to. However, having diplomatically and financially bankrolled Musharraf, the United States is now afraid to push him toward reform. Naturally, Washington wants to protect its investment.\nThe same line of thinking led us to give carte blanche to the Shah of Iran in the 1970s and to Afghan mujahadeen in the 1980s. Of course, at certain points in time, we needed to cooperate with some very undemocratic individuals to accomplish short-term goals in foreign policy. But because no long-term plan for moderate democratic regimes existed, the United States had to deal with such dire foreign policy failures as the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. \nIn Pakistan, the fractured society engendered by Musharraf has let fundamentalist groups set up madrassahs, fundamentalist schools that indoctrinate youngsters with bin Laden's way of thinking. Indeed, many al-Qaida sympathizers staff the very military that now controls the Pakistani government. Factors such as these, caused largely by Pakistani autocracy, have swelled the ranks of terrorist groups and hampered the fight against such organizations. It has created a foreign policy nightmare waiting to happen.\nSimply put, if we continue to support Musharraf without demanding reform, we eventually will sabotage the war on terror by creating the type of chaotic environment terrorists thrive on. If we are truly committed to democracy in the Muslim world, we must make it clear that even those we currently count among our friends need to reform.