After years of debate, the Supreme Court finally announced its ruling Monday in Grutter vs. Bollinger. \n"The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause," said the Honorable Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her writing of the affirming decision.\nThough the Court held that Michigan's undergraduate point system was unconstitutional, it allowed the "narrowly tailored" measures of Michigan's Law School that provided for a diverse classroom, something that would greatly enhance the learning potential of all students.\nSo, the point system is gone, but race can still be considered among a number of other factors when it comes to admission. So what's the news?\nPatrick Baude, professor of law and public service at IU's law school, noted the decision has nothing new to add to the debate.\n"The court just reaffirmed what has been going on for 25 years. It's difficult to figure out who's the winner or the loser there," he said. "The court didn't come out with any new definition of affirmative action, but didn't roll it back."\nOne of the primary problems that might arise in lieu of this ruling is the Court's definition of what constitutes a "narrowly tailored" policy. The case brief states: "To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot 'insulate each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants' ... Instead, it may consider race or ethnicity only as a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file; i.e., it must be 'flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.'"\nSo exactly how "flexible" are schools to be? What are the "pertinent elements of diversity"? And how do we place those elements "on the same footing" as other qualifications without "necessarily" giving them the same weight?\nThe definition is loaded with vague implications that, though they support the ideal of affirmative action, seem to leave far too much room for further lawsuits from opponents and proponents alike. The term "racial preferences" is deemed unusable, but a "race neutral" formula that just happens to promote diversity by allowing for the concept of race to be considered -- might it perhaps be "preferred" -- is accepted. \nThis decision is far from useful.\nThe Court cleverly devised a way to appease both sides of the American public, while at the same time avoiding taking a true stand on the issue. \nWith no guidelines short of copying verbatim Michigan Law School's policy, applicants to schools across the country are bound to find reasons whether they think affirmative action policies were used inappropriately against them -- whether that means individuals feel such "narrowly tailored" policies are working to bring in too many or too few minority applicants.\nLike the seemingly never-ending abortion debate, we have found ourselves in the grey area of politics. The program seems to be approved, but only on certain grounds. Which exactly those grounds are, we don't know.\nWe feel that before the ruling, the issue of affirmative action was a dark forest where the whole nation was lost. Now after the ruling we feel the nation is still in that forest, only now we know that forest's name: The Woods of the Passing Buck.
-- JP Benitez and Brandon Morley \nfor the Editorial Board
