A Fresh START

U.S. credibility in the international community, one can hardly dispute, has suffered a gradual deterioration over the past six years.

American integrity faltered amidst the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay scandals, but even these abominations appeared staged against a backdrop of broader incompetence – of unforeseen complications, of thoughtless strategy and bungled execution.

As the Obama administration heralds a new era of American diplomacy, analysts will be tempted to measure progress solely in terms of our most iconic challenges. Yet even if missions in Iraq and Afghanistan were to miraculously break up Middle Eastern terror networks, the specter of nuclear warfare will still persist as the gravest long-term threat to American security and world peace.

Although arms reduction endeavors have enjoyed success in the last decade, the prospect of confronting rogue nuclear states such as Pakistan and North Korea demand continued U.S. non-proliferation efforts, a foreign policy component the Bush presidency never formulated. Crucial to America’s achievement in this regard will be the cooperation of Russia in renegotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expires Dec. 5.

START has diminished each country’s capacity of warheads, ballistic missile throw-weight and strategic delivery vehicles. Additionally, complex measures within the treaty preclude each country from circumventing their commitments.

Since its passage in 1991, START has triggered the deactivation of 7,200 nuclear warheads and the disassembly of more than 2,000 Soviet intercontinental missiles.
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have become nuclear-free states, and both the United States and Russia have decreased their supply of weapons delivery vehicles to 1,600 each.

While START has exemplified the possibilities of Russo-American collaboration, the global political landscape has endured drastic transformations in the past 18 years. Following years of arms races and political brinksmanship, the complex accountability measures embedded in the original treaty engendered trust and cooperation between the two countries. Also, America exercised significant leverage in 1991 negotiations, for the Soviet collapse occurred just five months later.

In 2009, both countries will approach the table from vastly different positions, a factor to which American negotiators must show sensitivity. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia unified its political, economic and military powers; furthermore, many have interpreted Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August of 2008 as an expression of revived political and military belligerence.

In light of these transformative events, a simple reinstatement of START would advance antiquated policies where more adaptive, innovative policies are needed.
A modernized treaty would curtail remaining stockpiles without sacrificing a consistent verification regime. While diplomats should avoid contentious topics like missile defense, they should accept the flexibility of restructuring the treaty’s language over a set period, and most importantly, they should negotiate upon an assumption of trust and the mutual political value of reaching a new agreement.

Adhering to the treaty’s original aims – to improve political relationships by preserving the global nuclear framework – will enable each country to set realistic expectations for the other’s achievement. START can still restore trust and teamwork between two countries upon whose collaboration global peace depends.