Door closing on diplomatic solution

North Korea announced Feb. 10 that it has successfully developed a nuclear weapon. For the past decade, North Korea was suspected of trying to produce these weapons, and it confirmed this effort during negotiations in 2003. At that time, the United States estimated North Korea had produced, or had the ability to create, only a small number of these weapons. President Bush responded by focusing his foreign policy elsewhere instead of working with the far more pervasive threat in the North.\nAmerica now believes North Korea has two or three nuclear weapons, with some estimates ranging up to eight. North Korea also has developed long-range missiles, such as the Taepodong II, which is capable of reaching the United States. The passive stances taken by the last two administrations have given North Korea a decisive advantage it might never relinquish.\nThe United States has stated that a nuclear-armed Korea is unacceptable and has tried to prevent nuclear development through a variety of means. Approaches have ranged from President Clinton's Perry proposal, which offered incentives such as food and international aid in exchange for disarmament, to President George W. Bush's six-nation talks, which attempt to take North Korea out of its regional isolation and to shift some of the diplomatic burden off of the United States.\nThere are many different theories to explain Korea's motives. The North is a very poor nation facing an ongoing economic crisis. Many of its people face starvation, and threats from famine and disease are constant. In seeking to become a nuclear power, North Korea might be hoping to renew its people's faith in the government or at least give them a renewed sense of national pride and confidence. Kim Jong Il has portrayed himself as holding off the "imperialistic United States." Developing nuclear weapons confers a sense of national prestige. Some have theorized that through developing nuclear weapons and forcing the major world powers to negotiate with it, North Korea hopes to gain worldwide attention and international respect. The final theory is that the North is using these weapons as a bargaining chip to be cashed in for aid or food for its people.\nThe North's newest declaration does little to change the regional dynamics. North Korea already has acknowledged it was developing a nuclear weapon, and most of the world believed it had these weapons anyway. North Korea has yet to test any nuclear weapons, and until it does, its nuclear status is founded on the reliability of U.S. intelligence and the honesty of the communist dictatorship. The regional impact of a nuclear-armed North Korea is uncertain. The North is unlikely to spur neighboring countries to develop weapons. China is an ally of the North and an atomic power; Japan historically has been a staunch opponent to nuclear development; and South Korea is defended by the United States, which still maintains thousands of troops to protect its border with the North. \nOf course, the possession of these weapons make the North a greater threat. Every new nation that develops these weapons adds to the risk of accidental or unexpected launch. North Korea's decision to develop nuclear weapons certainly has made a tense situation more volatile. This has generated worldwide criticism, but until Pyongyang is convinced these weapons are not in its interest, the situation will not change. So far, efforts have been monumentally unsuccessful. \nThe United States responded to the North's declaration by renewing its commitment to six-nation talks and downplaying the significance of the announcement. The American decision has done little to improve the situation. North Korea so far has refused to meet with the United States in anything except a bilateral setting and has refused to participate in the six-nation discussions, putting significant pressure on Washington. The president has invested a great deal in the six-nation concept and in limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but he has produced no decisive diplomatic policy. A prudent response will be key to preventing another failure in Korea. Perhaps that opportunity has already passed.